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English: In this paper the ethical problem will be discussed how
moral judgments of foreign cultures and bygone epochs can be justi-
fied. After ruling out the extremes of moral absolutism (judging with-
out any reservations by the standards of one’s own culture and epoch)
and moral relativism (judging only by the respective standards of the
time and culture in question) the following solution to the dilemma is
sought: A distinction has to be made between judging the norms and
institutions in power at a certain place and time and judging people
acting within the social institutions of their time and culture. While
the former may be judged rigorously, only taking into account the
objective possibilities for having other institutions at a certain devel-
opment stage, the latter should be judged against the background of
the common sense morals of the respective time and culture.
German: In diesem Aufsatz wird das ethische Problem erörtert,
wie moralische Urteile über fremde Kulturen und vergangene Epochen
gerechtfertigt werden können. Nach Ausschluss der Extreme des
moralischen Absolutismus (uneingeschränkte Beurteilung nach den
Maßstäben der eigenen Moral) und des moralischen Relativismus
(Beurteilung ausschließlich nach den Maßstäben der beurteilten Kul-
tur oder Epoche) wird die folgende Lösung angestrebt: Es muss eine
Unterscheidung getroffen werden zwischen der Beurteilung der Nor-
men und der Insitutionen, die an einem bestimmten Ort und zu einer
bestimmten Zeit in Kraft sind, und der Beurteilung der Menschen, die
innerhalb der gesellschaftlichen Institutionen ihrer Zeit und Kultur
handeln. Während die ersteren rigoros beurteilt werden dürfen, nur
unter den Einschränkungen, die sich aus den objektiven Möglichkeiten
für andere Institutionen in einem bestimmten Entwicklungsstadium
ergeben, sollten die letzteren stets vor dem Hintergrund der “common
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1 Exposition of the Problem
The problem that I would like to address in this paper is how we can form
sound moral judgments of actions that take place outside of our own historical
and cultural context. Strictly speaking, there are two different problems,
one concerning historical judgments and one concerning judgments of other
cultures. But there is a strong logical similarity between both types of moral
judgments insofar as they both concern judgments about something that
takes place in a life context different from our own.
It is, I believe, easy to see that this is indeed a problem in the sense
that the historical or cultural context does make a difference for our moral
judgments. For example, when Alexander the Great conquered the city of
Tyros he crucified all remaining men in the city and sold the women and
children as slaves [Fox, 2005, p. 239]. Yet, despite the severe violation of
human rights during his conquests historians usually do not tend to place
Alexander in the same league with dictators like Saddam Hussein or Kim
Jong-il. Or, to take another example, it is reported that some tribes in the
highlands of New Guinea honor newly deceased relatives by devouring their
corpses [Diamond, 2005, p. 151]. Abhorrent as it may seem to us, there
would be no point in blaming the high-landers of New Guinea for following
a revered ancient custom.
Thus, there are many cases where a certain amount of cultural or histori-
cal moral relativism seems appropriate. It is simply a fact that values change
over time and differ between cultures. If we do not take account of this fact
in our ethical convictions, we risk to become hopelessly parochial or to slip
into absurdities. On the other hand, the opposite standpoint, a complete
cultural and historical relativism, would be equally unsound. For, to take an
extreme example, there is certainly no way of justifying the atrocities that
communist or fascist regimes committed in the last century on the grounds
that the allowance of licentious manslaughter was common at that time.
Obviously, we can neither leave historical and cultural contexts aside when
forming moral judgments nor must we fully submit to these contexts. The
right solution has to be a golden mean somewhere between these extremes.
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2 Breaking up the Question: Judgments of
Institutions and Judgments of People
Moral judgments can be formed with different goals in mind. They can be
formed for the purpose of conflict resolution, which is the case when a judge
decides a lawsuit. Or they can be formed merely with the aim of gaining
a well reasoned moral opinion on some subject matter. This is the goal of
historians when they judge historical persons and their actions. The former
requires that we reach definite and unambiguous solutions, while the latter
allows some amount of ambiguity. If it is just for the sake of forming an
opinion, we may look at the issue from different angles without reducing the
different perspectives to a single ultimate decision. The following discussion
is primarily concerned with well reasoned moral opinions. How the cases
where definite decisions must be made are to be dealt with will only briefly
be considered later, in the concluding paragraphs of this paper.
What then are the reference points that we should look out for in or-
der to form well reasoned moral judgments of strange cultures and bygone
epochs, if we are to avoid the extremes of imposing our set of values (moral
absolutism) and moral relativism alike? The solution that I would like to
propose is to make a fundamental difference between the judgment of social
institutions, including moral codes, and the judgment of people acting within
the social institutions of their time and culture. While the former may be
valuated rigorously, only taking into account the objective possibilities for
having other institutions at a certain development stage, the latter should be
judged against the background of the moral common sense of the respective
time and culture.
2.1 Judgments of Institutions and Moral Systems
When looking at moral systems or social institutions abstractly, we do not
need to take into account in how far it can be expected from a human being
to emancipate herself or himself from traditional moral prejudices and to
rise above the level of his or her surrounding. Under this perspective we
therefore do not need to have any hesitation to judge rigorously according to
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our own ethical standards. The reason why we should do so is simply that
morals matter. Moral rules regulate how people should treat each other and
it is a matter of great importance how people are treated – anywhere in this
world. More emphatically we could say that there exists some such thing as
a world responsibility which compells us and at the same time entitles us to
take up a stance on what happens to human beings anytime and anywhere
in this world.1 On a mythical level our world responsibility is the expression
of the unity of mankind that is of the moral bonds that connect any human
in this world with any other human being. If we assume world responsibility
in this sense we cannot suspend our moral judgment merely on behalf of the
remoteness of context – at least not when important matters are at stake.
There should be only two restrictions to the rigour of moral judgment in
this case: limits of possibilities and limits of importance. “Limits of possi-
bility” describe the fact that certain morally approvable goals may not be
feasible in some contexts. Take, for example, the introduction of liberal
democracy. This form of government (most probably) cannot exist if not
certain prerequisites concerning social structure, economic prosperity, edu-
cational level and the like are met [Schmidt, 2000, p. 438ff.]. Moreover, in
order to install a liberal democracy, a good deal of technical knowledge about
institutional arrangements and procedures is needed, a technical knowledge
that is in its fully developed form a relatively recent invention. Therefore,
it would be absurd to make a moral point of the absence of liberal democ-
racy in, say, medieval Europe. The same holds true for the intercultural
case, although it is a little less obvious there. For, if the technical knowledge
required to realize some moral goal exists somewhere in this world then it
should be readily available anywhere. But there can still be objective lim-
its of possibilities that preclude the realization of this or other moral goods
in a certain context. In this case we cannot simply judge according to our
own moral standards, which tacitly rely on the existence of certain “objective
possibilities” [Weber, 1988].
Regarding the limits of possibilities as a restriction of moral judgment,
1The idea of world responsibility is borrowed from the the total responsibility for ev-
erything that some strata of the philosophy of existentialism assume.
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there is a danger of mistakenly or dishonestly assuming limits of possibility
where really are none. The problem of determining objective possibilities
or the limits thereof is, however, more an epistemological problem than one
of moral philosophy. It is precisely the problem that historians and social
scientists face when they want to assess the “objective possibility” (Max We-
ber) of historical developments. As our knowledge of the laws that govern
social developments or the course of history is extremely limited, determining
the “objective possibilities or impossibilities” of social development is quite a
difficult task. The techniques by which social scientists help themselves out
when they want to assess the “objective possibilities” that a given historical
situation offers include the comparison with similar situations at a different
place or time, or looking at the alternatives that were (or are) under dis-
cussion among the actors within these situations, presuming that something
that was seriously considered by the contemporaries was probably not totally
unrealistic. Roughly speaking, anything that ever existed represents a pos-
sibility, but it may still not be a viable alternative in a given situation, and
conversely, some possibilities may never have been realized or even thought
of and still be realistic alternatives.
In the intercultural context the question is frequently raised whether the
adoption of certain values, for example modern values like human rights or
religious tolerance or democratic government, is compatible with a certain
cultural background, say Islamic culture. This is an important question con-
cerning “objective possibilities”, because if there really was such an incom-
patibility of modern values and cultural tradition, then demanding the the
adoption of modern values would entail nothing less than the abandonment
of a culture. To answer the question, whether the adoption of modern values
is compatible with retaining the traditional culture, a comparison with our
own culture might help. There was indeed a time when Christian occidental
culture posed quite a contrast to the above mentioned“modern values”. How-
ever, the propagation of these values through the movement of enlightenment
and ultimately their adoption did not lead to the abandonment of Christian
occidental culture but only to a transformation of this culture. There is no
reason why a similar transformation should be inaccessible to other cultures,
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although we will potentially have to face the fact that the members of other
cultures may perhaps not want to adopt modern values. But since there is an
objective possibility of consolating Islamic culture with modern values, we do
not need to have any hesitations about critizising the insufficient observance
of, say, the human rights in many Islamic countries today.
The other restriction for the judgment of moral systems and institutions
of foreign cultures or past epochs concerns limits of importance of the subject
matter at hand. The“importance of the subject matter”depends on the rank
of the moral values concerned and on the level of involvedness, which in turn
depends on spatial and temporal distance and the strength or weakness of
social or just empathetic ties. We can call the principle according to which
the importance of a moral subject matter decreases with remoteness the
principle of locality. A good example for the employment of this principle
are burial rites. In most countries (including western countries) these are
strictly regulated by the law and strong feelings are involved with regard to
the appropriateness of the respective ceremonial proceedings. Yet, although
the burial rites in different countries may strongly contradict each other, this
is hardly a matter of intercultural controversy. As their regulation by law
testifies, this does by no means entail that they are morally neutral.
There exists, however, a difference here between the intercultural case
and the historical case. In the historical case the moral importance may
indeed decrease until almost nothing is left. Historians do not really need to
argue about the human rights violations that occurred during Alexander’s
conquests, if only because there are other aspects of these happenings that
are of much greater historical interest. But in contemporary times, if in
some place of the world severe violations of human rights occur then the
moral aspect cannot be ignored.
Thus we could say that the importance of a moral questions is the smaller
the farther away it occurs and the lower the rank of the values involved, but
that when basic values are concerned it may never become so small as to
render the answer completely unimportant. The latter may be understood
as a consequence of our world responsibility.
With these restrictions moral judgments of strange cultures and distant
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epochs according to one’s own set of values represent the upper limit up
to which a rigorous moral absolutism (i.e. the unanimous application or
imposition of one’s own values in any context) is sensible. However, it is only
so, when we judge abstractly about moral systems or about institutions.
When we judge the actions of concrete people this is still too much, because
we have to take into account the unavoidable limitations of human nature
and especially the fact that anybody’s perspective is necessarily limited by
the time and culture he or she is born into and lives in. This will be the topic
of the following.
2.2 Judgments of People and their Actions
People in different countries and in different historical epochs act in accor-
dance with the most diverse systems of norms and values. But it is hardly
possible to accept all these different sets of values on an equal footing, not
unless we do not wish to take any of them serious any more. This, however,
raises the question of fairness when we form moral judgments about what
people did in former times or what people do in other places of the world.
The answer proposed here is that we should judge the actions of concrete
people against the background of the moral common sense of their respective
culture or historical period.2 This simple answer may at first sight appear like
plain moral relativism, but it is not. “Moral common sense” can be described
as the morals that are common knowledge and in effect over a longer period
of time.3 Moral common sense as a criteria frees us from the necessity to take
account of such sets of moral rules that are only transitory or that remain
partial even within one society or that are in the long run not compatible with
the neccessities of every day’s life. This is especially the case for morals that
may be characterized as the outcome of fanatism. Fanatism is an exceptional
state of mind that can hardly be kept up over a longer period of time, and
it is to its full extend often only adopted by a subgroup of the society. It
2This idea as well as the following discussion of “Übermoral” is strongly inspired by
Hermann Lübbe’s treatment of “political moralism” [Lübbe, 1987].
3This definition is, of course, not very strict, but only intended as a rough explanation
to supplement the verbal intuition the phrase “moral common sense” suggests.
7
may, for a certain while, act as a kind of “Übermoral” that overshadows
the common sense moral, but it will never fully replace the common sense
moral, although it must be assumed that it can influence the subsequent
development of the moral common sense to a certain degree. An example
for this kind of “Übermoral” are the morals embodied in the ideologies of
totalitarian states. Typically, the totalitarian morals are so excessive that
before they have pervaded the whole society they are either broken down or
have, before long, been watered down to a much more common sense like
version of themselves. That the Nazis made some attempts to hide the mass
extinction of the Jews from the rest of the populace bears proof of the fact
that they were aware of the existence of a another set of morals according
to which genocide is a crime. If they chose to rather adhere to Nazi morals
they can – even under the variant of moral relativism advocated here – be
held fully responsible for this choice.
The line of reasoning in the previous paragraph does, of course, rest on
the optimistic empirical assumption that “fanatical morals” are normally not
evolutionary stable. But if this is true then we can safely rule out fanatical
morals without risking to be “unfair” to the people acting according to a
fanatical set of morals. For, neither do we demand that they act according
to an enlightened set of morals that they cannot realistically be expected to
take account of (or even just be aware of), nor are we, by taking recourse
to the (context dependent) moral common sense, forced to accept the most
unreasonable moral excesses.
But is the criteria of moral common sense really sufficient? Several prob-
lems this criteria raises suggest that it is too liberal and therefore must be
restricted some more:
1. The criteria is ambiguous: There may be situations where several com-
mon sense morals are in conflict with each other. Also, the common
sense moral is continuously changing. According to which common
sense moral shall we then form our judgments?
2. The criteria is conservative: If we slavishly stick to the criteria of moral
common sense then we would always have to give bad marks to those
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people that are ahead of their time. Moral progress would be practically
forbidden.
3. The criteria is insufficient in cases, where the traditional morals al-
low or even demand grave moral vices: While fanatism may be only
short lived, atavisms and superstitions can be an unquestioned part
of a moral tradition. An extreme example is that of genital mutila-
tion of girls practiced in some regions of Africa [Amnesty International
Report]. The practice is so abhorrent that any abstract principle of
moral judgment that does not allow to banish it, must be considered
insufficient.
1) The first objection does not necessarily call for a restriction of the
criteria of moral common sense, but for a further decision on whether it
should be applied liberally or in a more strict way. A liberal application
would mean that any of the several conflicting common sense morals should
be accepted. That is, if some action is right according to one of these different
common sense morals, we are not entitled to criticize the person committing
it any more. This may lead to contradictions in the sense that possibly
opposing actions must both be accepted as morally legitimate. (Borrowing
a metaphor from politics we could say that as outside observers we ought
to follow a policy of non intervention when different common sense morals
conflict.)
The other way to resolve the conflict between several competing common
sense norms, would be to just pick the one that deems us the best (accord-
ing to our own values) as reference. One might object that this solution
essentially breaks the moral relativism to which we have confined ourselves
when judging the actions of people. But, after all, we have only introduced
a limited relativism to avoid unfair moral judgments. The sort of judg-
ments to be excluded on behalf of their unfairness are primarily those where
we would implicitly demand from people to become moral inventors in case
their conventional morals should prove unacceptable to our enlightened stan-
dards. But if we confine what we may call the justified demand of moral
self-reflection to the respectable systems of common sense morals competing
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within the context under discussion then the unfairness is much smaller and
may to this extent be justified by our urge not to give in to a full fledged
moral relativism. Of course, whether we ought to choose a liberal or a strict
application of the criteria of moral common sense, may depend on the par-
ticular circumstances, especially the moral importance of the subject matter
in question.4
2) The second objection can only be met by extending our criteria of
moral common sense, so that it also includes progressive morals (from our
own point of view). Unfortunately, we can now hardly argue for a strict
application of the criteria in the above (1) sense any more, because it would
seem unfair to expect from the majority of people the appreciation of the
progressive point of view right away. What we have gained is only that we
are not forced to condemn the progressivists as a consequence of our own
criteria. This may in effect lead to “tragical situations”, situations where
conflicting values clash without even a theoretical possibility of resolution.5
3) The third objection could appear to be the most crucial one, because
it seems to force us to dilute our criteria of moral common sense by other
criteria like the criterion of moral importance, which otherwise should – due
to its relatively strong subjectivity – only be applied as a lower rank criteria.
But if we think about it a little longer then we might also come to the
conclusion that it is especially the case of superstitions and atavisms where
the two-tier approach to moral judgments of institutions and norm systems
as such and the people acting within these systems pays off. The best way
to overcome superstitious customs is by education and tenacious convincing.
4It should be emphasized that even if we chose the liberal application of the criteria of
moral common sense, we still need not include fanatism in the previously described sense,
because fanatism does not even count as common sense moral.
5Usually, there are good reasons for avoiding “tragical situations” in any system of
ethics: Tragical situations are often just a bad excuse for not taking a stance or for
already having chosen the wrong side in the past. More importantly, tragical situations
are essentially a type of ethical contradiction and contradictions should by and large be
avoided. What appears as a contradiction in an ethical system is in practice a matter
that is decided by the right of the strongest. Normally, we do not want that. But if
there is really no sensible way to resolve an ethical conflict it might in certain exceptional
cases even be the most humane choice to accept tragical situations and thereby the decision
according to the right of the strongest. For, then the inferior is still spared from additional
moral humiliation of having been illegitimately wrong.
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A moralizing attitude is in danger of producing the adverse effect. The two-
tier approach allows us to condemn the practice itself without reacting with
moral reproach against the very people that need to be convinced.
If we keep in mind that, following our two-tier approach, the social in-
stitutions as such should still be judged rigorously, then the relatively weak
criteria of moral common sense may, with the qualifications made above, be
morally satisfactory for the judgment of concrete people and their actions.
3 Objections and Refinement
The two-tier approach to moral judgments concerning foreign cultures and
bygone epochs permits a multifaceted and – as I hope – much more balanced
view than a single set of criteria would. Still, it is open to many objections,
the most obvious of which is that it introduces too many and too grave
contradictions into our moral reasoning. For example, we can be forced to
condemn a certain action taking place in different cultural context because it
contradicts one or more of our core values, and at the same time we cannot
criticize the person performing this action because he or she acts according to
accepted moral standards of his or her culture. I believe that tolerating this
kind of contradictions is a lesser evil than either laissez-faire moral relativism
or the intercultural arrogance of moral absolutism. (Of course, a certain
dose of both relativism as well as Western arrogance is still present in my
approach.)
When forming an opinion we can be content with a multifaceted view and,
most probably, this is even better than a single sided view. But when we
have to take decisions then these must be unanimous. The problem becomes
urgent, for example, when we have to decide on how to deal with immigrant
subcultures that bring their own traditional values, some of which might
come into conflict with moral standards of the host society. There can be
only one law in one country, so that at least when the conflict comes down
to legal matters, we will probably have to revert to a solution that is more
in the spirit of moral absolutism. Still, our judgments will be more reasoned
if we keep in mind that the problem as such is not as simple.
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Quite the opposite becomes true, when we are concerned with intercul-
tural dialogue. One can hardly start profitable a dialogue on the basis of a
claim of moral superiority. A dialogue can only succeed when the partners
talk to each other on an equal footing, which requires an attitude that may
be termed the willing relativism of dialogue. This does not mean that we are
not allowed to stand by our moral convictions, but prima facie we will look
at the convictions of the others as equally respectable.
Summing it up, the two-tier approach to moral judgments expounded
here will in many concrete situations have to be resolved to a more univocal
point of view or judgment. However, putting the step of resolving last (in
situations where this is necessary) has the heuristic advantage to allow more
well reasoned judgments over the alternative of deciding definitely on a sys-
tem of values first. It allows us to criticize moral standards that we strongly
reject without having to react irritated against the people who comply with
them. The moral judgments arrived at by the two-tier approach will there-
fore probably be more satisfactory than otherwise. The latter does, of course,
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